The explanation Labour has given for the collapse of the China spy trial is, according to former security minister Tom Tugendhat, utterly unfounded and misleading. Tugendhat argues that the government’s failure to provide a civil servant to officially declare China as a national security threat during the trial was not a mere oversight but a deliberate political choice. This point strikes at the core of why the espionage case against Christopher Berry and Chris Cash fell apart.
Tugendhat, who originally helped establish the research group where Cash worked, criticized Labour leader Keir Starmer’s response, noting that instead of taking responsibility, Starmer shifts blame to the intelligence services and the police. He says Starmer implies these agencies didn’t fully understand the case or the nature of the prosecution, leading to an arrest without solid evidence—an astonishing claim, if true.
Highlighting his own stance, Tugendhat referenced his April 2024 parliamentary speech where he publicly identified China as a “principal national security threat.” He revealed that a detailed dossier exists somewhere within Whitehall, packed with irrefutable evidence proving China poses serious risks to UK security. This dossier reportedly includes details about unauthorized overseas police stations, harassment of Hong Kong activists living in Britain, industrial espionage activities, and even cyber intrusions targeting the UK Ministry of Defence. Tugendhat insists this critical evidence was ready and waiting to be presented in court by a government civil servant.
Pointing to the meticulousness of the police investigation, he stressed the seriousness with which the espionage case against Cash and Berry was handled, condemning attempts to simply sweep the matter under the rug.
The political dispute intensified after Britain's top prosecutor, Stephen Parkinson, publicly blamed Labour for the trial’s collapse. Parkinson disclosed that the Crown Prosecution Service dedicated many months trying to obtain witness statements affirming that China represented a security threat to the UK at the time. Despite receiving further statements, none explicitly confirmed China as a threat during the period in question, leading to the prosecution being dropped on September 15 when barrister Tom Little KC declared the case untenable at the Old Bailey.
In his letter to MPs, Parkinson highlighted a crucial High Court ruling from a previous Russian spy case, which established that the term “enemy” under the 1911 Official Secrets Act must apply only to countries posing a genuine, present security threat at the time of the alleged offences. After this ruling, prosecutors repeatedly sought the government’s support in defining China as such an enemy but failed to secure any witness testimony to that effect.
The fallout sparked heated debate, with the sitting Prime Minister firmly placing blame on the previous Conservative government. The argument is that since the Tories never formally designated China as a national security threat during their tenure, Labour was effectively barred from retroactively applying that label to justify the prosecution.
Sir Keir Starmer, briefed throughout the entire process, defended this legal interpretation. He stressed that the designation of a country as a security threat must be fixed at the time when the offense supposedly occurred—in this case, 2023—and cannot be applied retroactively two years later to support prosecution.
This controversy raises some provocative questions: Should national security designations be flexible and updated in response to evolving threats, or must they remain strictly tied to official government positions at specific times, even if intelligence suggests otherwise? And if political considerations influence such designations, what impact does that have on the impartial application of justice in sensitive espionage cases?
These questions touch upon the heart of the debate and reveal much about how security, law, and politics intertwine in this high-profile case. What do you think? Should governments be able to withhold or delay such crucial security classifications, potentially risking justice? Or is strict adherence to legal formalities paramount, even if it means serious security concerns go unchallenged in court?
